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According to Herodotus, in the ancient Greek times when the Olympics were on, 
Xerxes and Mardonius asked to a group of Greek deserters what prize the Olympic 
winners should get. The answer was “An olive-wreath." Tigranes, one of Xerxes´s 
generals, uttered: “Good heavens! Mardonius, what manner of men are these against 
whom you have brought us to fight – men who contend with one another, not for 
money, but for honor!”  Herodotus (Book 8, Urania, 26, 1) 
 
1. Introduction 
Contemporary economists have no clear answer on whether the organization of the modern Olympic 
Games is a matter of honor or a matter of money. Although the acquirement of international prestige is 
obvious, the economic advantages for hosting the Games are not that clear. The economic benefits of 
hosting the Games are dubious for most academics who have conducted independent research on the 
issue (see, for example, Owen (2005)). In particular, the current consensus in the literature is that the 
contemporaneous and post-hosting effects of the Olympic Games on output and aggregate demand are 
limited. From a macroeconomists point of view, this is a puzzle because total expenditures on these 
mega events are large: for example, the total cost of the Summer Olympic Games that were held in 
China in 2008 is estimated to be in the range of 40-60 billion USD.1 
 The starting point of our analysis is that the bidding for a mega event such as the Olympic 
Games is associated with important anticipation effects. One of the main results in modern 
macroeconomic theory, summarized in Lorenzoni (2011), is that the economy should react to this news 
already before the event takes place: consumers and firms may become more optimistic about future 
economic prospects; they, thus, spend more and aggregate private consumption and investment increase 
at the time of optimism.  If the optimism is justified, the economy converges to a higher long-run path; 
if it is not, output returns to its original trend.  
Identifying empirically news shocks is a tough task because identification problems can be 
severe. For example, Beaudry and Portier (2006) use a bivariate VAR that includes a measure of TFP 
and the quarterly S&P 500 index and identify news shocks as a shock that does not affect productivity 
in the short run but affects productivity in the long run. The identified news shocks lead to positive 
                                                 
1 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cost_of_the_Olympic_Games, or http://epiac1216.wordpress.com/2008/08/03/the-
total-cost-of-the-beijings-summer-olympic-games. Available data on the estimated expenditures of other recent Olympic 
Games, such as those hosted in Italy (2006), Greece (2004), and the US (2004) show that total expenditures on the 
Olympic Games are typically also in the billions. See also http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cost_of_the_Olympic_Games for 
further information. 
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conditional comovements among macroeconomic aggregates and, moreover, are found to be an 
important source of business cycle fluctuations. On the other hand, Barsky and Sims (2012) identify 
news shocks as shocks that have the most predictive power in explaining future TFP but are orthogonal 
to the current TFP innovation. They find that output, investment and hours fall slightly after a news 
shock while consumption increases. Blanchard et al. (2010) show that the use of structural 
identification assumptions in a VAR setting is sensitive to the informational assumptions made and that 
SVAR shocks may be perfectly anticipated by the consumers. These authors point to the adoption of 
more structural models for the identification of news shocks. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (forthcoming) 
present a structural model in which agents receive anticipated news. They find that such shocks account 
for about half of predicted aggregate fluctuations.  
The literature has also looked at the effects of data revisions as a source of noise in private 
sector forecasts. For example, Frenkel (1981), Engel and Frankel (1984) and Hardouvelis (1987) have 
looked at the response of interest rates to the news embodied in the weekly money supply 
announcements. Hardouvelis (1988) and Gürkaynak et al. (2005a and 2005b) examine how exchange 
rates, interest rates, and long-term forward rates respond to monetary news and to monthly 
macroeconomic news. Such news coming from the unemployment rate, the industrial production index, 
personal income, and orders of durable goods series provide information about the state of the business 
cycle and are closely watched by economic forecasters. Bartolini et al. (2008) explore how the release 
of new economic data affects asset prices in the stock, bond, and foreign exchange markets.  
 All these studies employ time series information and do not exploit specific announcements – 
such as the organization of the Olympic Games – to measure news shocks in the data. Because of the 
particular nature of the bidding and planning process, the Olympic Games provide a unique opportunity 
to test for anticipation effects in macroeconomic data: about ten to eight years before the actual hosting 
of the Olympic Games the bidding process begins; then, after a technical evaluation of the original bids 
by the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the top five bids are shortlisted -- and a host city is 
selected seven years before the actual organization of the Olympic Games. The election of the host city 
is made by the assembled active IOC members, each possessing one vote. Members from countries that 
have a city taking part in the bidding for the Olympic Games are unable to vote.  
 Given the nature of the bidding process, agents in candidate countries receive a signal for 
possible macroeconomic changes ten to eight years before hosting. The bidding signal gives typically a 
1/5 probability to the country for holding the event, while the winning signal, seven years before the 
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organization, produces certain news for investment planning in the following years. This particular 
information structure allows us to test whether such news affect economic behavior and explicitly 
examine the role of expectations and uncertainty realization in shaping macroeconomic outcomes. To 
the best of our knowledge our study is the first in the literature to investigate if agents react in 
anticipation of future events with macroeconomic data using a widespread signal such as the 
organization of the Olympics. 
 To analyze the effects of Olympic “news” we use a panel of 188 countries spanning the period 
1950-2009. We construct two separate Olympic Games indicator variables. One for countries that bid 
and were selected to host the Games; and another for countries that bid and were not selected to host 
the Games. We employ panel fixed effects estimation techniques that allow for contemporaneous, 
future, as well as lagged effects of the Olympic Games. Within this panel fixed effects estimation 
framework, we examine how variations in countries' per capita GDP growth, private consumption, 
investment, government consumption expenditures, the price level and the exchange rate are related to 
the hosting and bidding for the Olympic Games.  
Our empirical analysis provides support for the identification scheme adopted in Beaudry and 
Portier (2006): in the bidding countries output growth, investment, and private consumption 
significantly increase about nine to seven years before the Olympic Games are hosted. According to the 
theoretical predictions, after the announcement of the hosting country, investment decreases in the 
bidding countries (that unsuccessfully bid to host the Games) and there are no significant long-run 
effects associated with bidding for the Olympic Games on output, investment, or private consumption.  
In contrast to the bidding countries, there is a significant positive effect on macroeconomic 
variables in hosting countries that occurs five to two years before the hosting of the Games. GDP 
growth increases significantly during the previous five years before hosting, and the peak response 
occurs four years before the actual hosting. This increase in GDP per capita growth is due to a 
significant positive and quantitatively large increase in investment and private consumption. 
Government consumption spending also increases significantly four years in advance of the actual 
event. Our empirical analysis of the effects in hosting countries thus implies that hosting the Olympic 
Games entails more than an "Olive Wreath": it has real macroeconomic effects that are positive as well 
as long-lasting; and these effects show up in the data well in advance of the actual hosting of the event. 
It is also important to note that the responses of key macroeconomic variables are significantly 
different between bidding and hosting countries after the announcement of which country gets to host 
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the Olympic Games (for the years preceding the announcement the differences in effects between 
bidding and hosting countries are all insignificant).  
Recently, Rose and Spiegel (2011) show that hosting and bidding for the Olympic Games has a 
positive impact on international trade. Using a variety of trade models, the authors document that this 
effect is statistically robust, permanent, and large. Our paper should be viewed as complementary to 
their study. First, the focus of our paper is on a broad set of macroeconomic variables such as growth in 
GDP per capita, consumption, and investment. Second, Rose and Spiegel claim that what matters for 
the increase in international trade is the signal countries send to international markets when bidding for 
the Olympics. We show that the bidding and hosting of the Olympics entails more than that since these 
events are associated with significant anticipation effects that induce positive output, investment, and 
consumption responses well in advance before the actual hosting of the Games. Our finding of 
significant anticipation effects is of substantive interest, both to the field of international 
macroeconomics as well as to the policy debate on the costs and benefits of hosting the Olympic 
Games. Third, by focusing on the anticipation effects associated with the hosting and bidding for the 
Olympic Games, we can provide an answer to a number of questions left open in Rose and Spiegel 
such as, for example, why open economies should bid to host the Olympic Games and why countries 
bid repeatedly for the organization of such events. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and estimation 
approach. Section 3 presents the main results. Robustness checks are discussed in Section 4 and 
Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Data and Estimation Approach 
We obtain data on the Olympic Games bidding and hosting countries from www.olympic.org. Data 
Appendix Table 1 lists the bidding and hosting countries in our sample. Data on real per capita GDP, 
private consumption, investment, government consumption expenditures, the consumer price level, and 
the nominal exchange rate (defined as the ratio of home to US currency) are from the Penn World 
Table, version 7.0 (Heston et al., 2011). The data on exports and imports are from the World 
Development Indicators (World Bank, 2011). 
 We estimate the effects of the Olympic Games using a panel of 188 countries spanning the 
period 1950-2009.2 This is the largest possible sample given the availability of data. The econometric 
                                                 
2 In our working paper Bruckner and Pappa (2011) we reported estimates for the 1950-2007 period, thus excluding the 
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model is: 
           Yit = a0Hostit  + A(L)Hostit  +B(F)Hostit +c0Bidit  + C(L)Bidit  +D(F)Bidit +αi+βt +eit       (1) 
where Hostit is an indicator variable that is unity in country i and year t if the country hosted in year t 
the Olympic Games. Bidit is an indicator variable that is unity in country i and year t if the country was 
bidding to host the Olympic Games that were held in year t. Because over the 1950-2009 period 
bidding to host the Olympic Games took place about eight to ten years before the actual hosting of the 
Games, we include up to ten leads of the bidding and hosting country indicator variable on the right-
hand side of the estimating equation, so that B(F) = b1F + b2F2 + ... + b10F10 and D(F) = d1F + 
d2F2+ ... + d10F10. The coefficients in the polynomial B(F) and D(F) capture the ex-ante effects of 
hosting and bidding for the Olympic Games. Similarly, we examine the ex-post effects of the Olympic 
Games by including up to ten lags on the right-hand side of the estimating equation, such that A(L) = 
a1L +a2L2+ ... + a10L10 and C(L) = c1L +c2L2+ ... + c10L10. The contemporaneous effects of the 
Olympic Games for the bidding and hosting countries are captured by the coefficients a0 and c0. We 
examine whether bidding and hosting the Olympics has long-run (i.e. permanent) effects on the 
outcome variables Yi,t by testing whether the sum of the estimated coefficients on the contemporaneous, 
ex-ante and ex-post dummy variables is significantly different from zero.  
 Note that as control variables in equation (1) we have included country fixed effects αi  and year 
fixed effects βt. The country fixed effects are an important control variable because they account for 
time-invariant country specific unobservables that may affect the likelihood of hosting and bidding for 
the Olympic Games and the outcome variable Yit. Hence, any fixed factors such as climate, continent, 
language, or differences in average incomes per capita are controlled for with the inclusion of the 
country fixed effects. The year fixed effects account for year-specific common factors, such as for 
example the world business cycle. Because we control for both country and year fixed effects our 
estimated slope coefficients can be interpreted as a result of a difference-in-difference estimation.  
 Our outcome variables – real per capita GDP, consumption, investment, government 
consumption expenditures, the price level, and the exchange rate – are highly persistent. In fact, the Im, 
Pesaran, and Shin (2003) panel unit root test does not reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in these 
                                                                                                                                                                       
recent financial crisis. Given the recent availability of an updated PWT 7.0 database that allows coverage up to 2009, we 
report in this paper estimates for the longest possible sample. Estimates reported in Bruckner and Pappa (2011) that 
excluded the years 2008 and 2009, and that were based on the PWT 6.3 data, yielded very similar results to the ones 
reported here.  
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variables, but it rejects the hypothesis of a unit root for the first difference. Therefore, we use the first 
difference of these logged variables in the estimating equation. We note that we cluster the error term, 
eit, at the country level so that it may be arbitrarily serially correlated within countries over time.  
 Our key identifying assumption in the estimation of equation (1) is that, conditional on fixed 
country characteristics, the hosting and bidding for the Olympic Games is randomly assigned. Of 
course, a certain level of economic development is required to host the Games. However, whether 
countries have this level of economic development is captured by the country dummies, αi. In other 
words, these country dummies take into account that some countries have the capacity to host the 
Games while other countries do not have this capacity. Our assumption of random assignment is, thus, 
that conditional on having the capacity to host the Olympic Games the timing of when countries bid 
and host the Games is random. In this regard, it is important to note that the bidding for the Olympic 
Games takes place ten to eight years prior to the celebration of the Games. The incidence of the 
Olympic Games is therefore a predetermined event. The fact that bidding countries are excluded from 
voting when the International Olympic Committee convenes to decide which country will be selected 
to host the Olympic Games also implies that bidding countries have no influence on which country is 
chosen to host the Games. We will come back to the assumption of random assignment in Section 4.1 
where we discuss and investigate it further. 
 
3. Main Results 
3.1. Anticipation Effects 
We begin the discussion of the results by focusing on the bidding countries, and thus, on anticipation 
effects. Beaudry and Portier (2006) show using a SVAR approach that news shocks lead to positive 
comovements in aggregate variables that mimic demand shocks. From a partial equilibrium point of 
view it is easy to model an economy in which news increase output, investment and consumption. 
Agents receive news about future developments that change their expectations about the future, which 
makes them spend and invest more. Both the permanent income hypothesis and the neoclassical 
investment theory would support this view. The literature has provided mechanisms (see Lorenzoni 
(2010) for an extensive review) that deliver increases in consumption, investment, output and hours 
after a news shock in general equilibrium models. The news shock we consider can have many 
interpretations: it can be thought of as news about future government investment that enhances private 
productivity and results in increases in aggregate demand during the bidding phase; it can be thought of 
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as a shock to expected demand from tourism; or as a structural reform that increases the openness of 
the economy (see, e.g., Rose and Spiegel (2011)). 
Our results in Table 1 are consistent with the finding in Beaudry and Portier (2006): output 
growth, investment, and private consumption significantly increase during the period that countries bid 
for the Olympics. There is a significant positive output growth, investment, and private consumption 
response in the bidding countries about seven to nine years before the actual hosting of the Games. 
Investment responds first, while output and private consumption react with a one-year lag relative to 
investment. Government consumption spending, the price level and the exchange rate do not react 
significantly to the news.  
 Moreover, responses should be similar for all bidding countries between the bidding dates and 
the decision date. Panel A of Table 4 reports the p-values on the null hypothesis that the ex-ante and 
contemporaneous coefficients on the hosting and bidding indicator variables (that we obtained from 
equation (1)) are the same. The main finding is that the coefficients ten to six years prior to the event 
are not significantly different in the bidding and hosting countries; this can be seen from the p-values 
which are all larger than 0.1 for the null hypothesis that the coefficients are equal. Hence during the 
time of the bidding phase, there is no evidence that the macroeconomic effects differ for unsuccessful 
bidding countries and hosting countries. Given that there is no evidence of a significant difference in 
the effects, we report in Table 2 estimates from an alternative regression where for the bidding phase, 
unsuccessful bidding countries are pooled with hosting countries. The main result is that this alternative 
regression confirms the presence of anticipation effects: private investment, consumption and output 
react significantly eight to nine years before the organization of the Games. We now turn to discussing 
our estimates of the effects of the actual hosting of the Olympic Games. 
  
3.2. Hosting Effects 
3.2.1 Contemporaneous and Ex-Ante Effects  
We report in Table 3 estimates of the contemporaneous and ex-ante effects of hosting the Olympic 
Games. Column (1) shows that countries which hosted the Olympic Games experienced a significant 
increase in their real per capita GDP growth up to five years before the organization of the event. The 
peak effect occurs about four years prior to hosting. The estimated coefficients imply that at peak real 
per capita GDP growth increases by up to two and a half percentage points. Notice that in the year 
when the Olympic Games are hosted the effect on GDP per capita growth is positive but insignificant, 
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which suggests that the main effects on GDP per capita growth occurred already well in advance before 
the actual hosting of the Games.   
It is noteworthy that the results in column (1) of Table 3 are compatible with the patterns of 
actual investment since many countries followed the 2-4-1 investment plan before the Games: 2 years 
of planning, 4 years of constructions and 1 year of testing (see, e.g., Preuss (2004)). Indeed column (2) 
of Table 3 shows that the reason for the significant increase in GDP per capita growth is a significant 
positive and quantitatively large increase in investment. The peak investment effect coincides with the 
peak output effect. Investment responses are still significantly different from zero three years before 
actual hosting. Investment reacts faster than government consumption spending (see column (4) of 
Table 3). The strongest reaction of government consumption spending occurs on average two years 
before hosting. Column (3) shows that the private consumption response follows a similar pattern as 
output; the exception is that, in contrast to output, the contemporaneous response of private 
consumption to the hosting of the Olympic Games is positive and significant at the 5 percent 
significance level.  
We find also a significant positive ex-ante effect of the hosting of the Olympic Games on the 
consumer price index and the nominal exchange rate. The estimates in columns (5) and (6) of Table 3 
show that there is already a significant positive response in consumer prices five years before the actual 
hosting of the Olympic Games; and in the exchange rate about seven years before the actual hosting, 
that is, at the time when the announcement of the hosting country is made.  
In Figure 1 we present our findings differently by plotting the cumulative effects (and 90% 
confidence bands) after the announcement of the Olympic Games hosting country. The figure is clear 
about the importance of the ex-ante effects: all variables, except government spending, increase 
significantly prior to hosting with exchange rates reacting more significantly immediately after the 
announcement. 
  Comparing the maximum output responses between the bidders (Table 1) and the winners 
(Table 3) we note that actual hosting increases GDP growth by three times more than bidding for the 
Games. Moreover, the impact of hosting on GDP is quite sizable if one considers how big Olympics are 
relative to the size of the hosting economies. It is difficult to find accurate data on actual spending 
associated with the Olympics. Preuss (2004) provides some evidence on the size of the Games and 
suggests they vary between 0.006 (Atlanta 1996) and 5 (Athens 2004) percent of GDP, with an average 
of 0.4 percent of GDP. Because our panel estimates capture an average response, we need to use the 
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average spending on the Olympic Games to compute the average dollar increase in GDP for each dollar 
spent on the Olympic Games (the "multiplier). Using the 0.4 percent of GDP as a benchmark for the 
average country's spending on the Olympic Games, the coefficients in column (1) of Table 3 imply a 
peak multiplier (at four years before the hosting of the Olympic Games) of about six. 
According to the expectations hypothesis responses should be similar for all bidding countries 
between the bidding dates and the decision date. However, once the International Olympic Committee 
has announced which country will host the Games, responses should differ between hosting and 
unsuccessful bidding countries. The Olympics bidding can also be interpreted as a noise shock in the 
spirit of Angeletos and La’O (2010). In unsuccessful bidding countries the agents’ optimism turns out 
to be unjustified and, as a result, the economy returns to its original trend. Panel A of Table 4 shows 
that indeed this is the case. The coefficients that capture the effects of the Olympic Games on GDP 
growth two to five years before the celebration of the Games in the host countries are significantly 
different from the coefficients in the bidding countries. Hence, pooling unsuccessful bidding countries 
with hosting countries as we did in Table 2 is a valid approach for testing anticipation effects (since the 
p-values in Panel A of Table 4 for ten to six years prior to the hosting of the Games indicate no 
significant difference between unsuccessful bidding and hosting countries), but it is not a valid 
approach for testing ex-ante effects that may be present up to five years before the actual hosting of the 
Games.  
 
3.2.2. Ex-Post Effects 
Table 5 examines whether hosting the Olympic Games has significant ex-post effects. Columns 
(1) and (3) show that the effects on output and private consumption are positive up to six years after the 
hosting of the Olympic Games. After six years the growth responses turn negative in sign, but they are 
statistically insignificant. For investment, the lagged effects of the Olympic Games are significantly 
negative in sign already two years after the actual hosting of the Games. Also, for government 
consumption expenditures, the consumer price index, and the nominal exchange rate the ex-post effects 
of hosting the Olympic Games are quantitatively small and insignificant. Table 5 therefore shows that 
the ex-post effects of hosting the Games are of relatively minor importance when compared to the ex-
ante effects. 
 The results in Table 5 might justify the findings of many studies (see Owen (2005)) that indicate 
that the economic benefits of organizing mega events such as the Olympic Games are quantitatively 
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and economically small. Our analysis stresses that the benefits from organizing such events are not 
contemporaneous, nor lagged. We find that the positive effects of the Olympic Games have to do with 
the ex-ante effects they induce.  
 
3.2.3 Cumulative Effects 
The hosting of the Olympic Games may be associated with a long-term legacy effect. According to the 
supporters of the Olympic Games infrastructure investments lead to improvements in overall 
production conditions for domestic and foreign enterprises, making investment more attractive and 
increasing GDP per capita in the long run. We can examine whether the hosting and bidding for the 
Olympic Games had a long-run effect on the level of GDP per capita and the other variables of interest. 
We do this by summing up the estimated coefficients, and test whether their sum is significantly 
different from zero.  
 Panel A of Table 6 shows that for the hosting countries the sum of the estimated coefficients for 
the GDP per capita and private consumption response are positive and significantly different from zero 
at the 90 percent level. For the hosting countries the Olympic Games were hence associated with 
permanently higher levels of GDP per capita and private consumption. On the other hand, Panel B 
shows that for the bidding countries there were no significant long-run effects. The sum of the 
estimated coefficients is quantitatively small and statistically insignificant at any conventional 
confidence level. In Panel C we test for the existence of significant differences between the long-run 
effects of the Olympic Games in the host countries and the bidding countries. For GDP per capita and 
consumption we can reject with over 95 percent confidence that the long-run effects are the same in the 
host and the bidding countries.3   
In Figure 2 we plot the cumulative effects for the host countries (continuous line) and the 
bidding countries (dashed line) for the set of variables we consider. The cumulative responses of all the 
variables for the periods before the announcement of the hosting country are similar and we cannot 
reject the hypothesis that both hosting and bidding countries behave the same. However, after the 
                                                 
3 In Appendix Table 1 we document that the estimates on the lagged Olympic Games bidding indicators are either 
significantly negative or insignificant. In Appendix Table 2 we document that the findings on the long-run estimates 
continue to hold when controlling on the right-hand side of the estimating equation for lags of the dependent variable. In 
that case, also the long-run investment response is significantly different from zero in the hosting countries, and 
significantly different from the long-run investment response of the bidding countries. 
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announcement of the host, per capita GDP continues to increase in the hosting countries while in the 
countries that unsuccessfully bid for the Olympic Games per capita GDP decreases. This is apparent in 
the top left-hand panel of Figure 2 where we plot the cumulative effects on output growth. Output 
increases significantly two periods before the announcement of the winner, but output growth starts 
immediately to fall after the bad “news” of having lost the bid are revealed. On the other hand, for the 
hosting countries, output growth increases with a faster pace, and, particularly so, for the four years 
before the celebration of the Games. For the components of output which are displayed in the next 
three panels the pattern is similar. The cumulative effects on inflation and the exchange rate, displayed 
in the bottom panels of Figure 2, are also different for hosting and bidding countries. 
Results are informative about the nature of the Olympic ‘news’ signal. As mentioned earlier, 
Olympics bidding might be associated with news about changes in infrastructure; changes in foreign 
demand through tourism; or structural changes in the degree of openness of the economy. The results 
confirm the nature of the news have to do with future changes in aggregate supply relative to demand 
since the effect in the hosting countries turns out to be permanent and quantitatively large.  
Also, results provide support for the identification of news shocks proposed by Beaudry and 
Portier (2006). Blanchard et al. (2010) show that if attention is limited in models in which consumers 
can perfectly anticipate future shocks the SVAR identification scheme can recover the true news 
shocks. If we think of the Olympic games bidding as a signal that reveals information about future 
shocks, it is not surprising to find that the responses of the macroeconomy to Olympics’ news 
resembles the ones of the economy with news identified through a SVAR using the restrictions of 
Beaudry and Portier (2006), even though the identification method to recover the shocks is very 
different. 
  
 
4. Sensitivity Analysis 
We have performed a number of sensitivity tests to ensure that our results are robust. In the paper we 
report only those estimates that we believe to be more relevant for providing robustness. The other 
estimates not reported here are reported in a supplementary online appendix that is available for 
download at http://sites.google.com/site/markusbrucknerresearch/research-papers.4  
                                                 
4 In our working paper Bruckner and Pappa (2011) we had reported also estimates of the macroeconomic effects of the 
International Expositions and the World Cup. Those estimates showed significant ex-ante effects, i.e. macroeconomic 
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4.1 The Nature of the Experiment 
The central assumption in our panel data regressions is that, conditional on fixed country 
characteristics, the hosting and bidding for the Olympic Games is randomly assigned. If this 
assignment is indeed random, then we have a natural experiment in hand which allows us to examine 
the causal effects that an exogenous, but anticipated, shock has on the macroeconomy. The 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) that is responsible for making the decision of which country 
will host the Olympic Games states: "only rich countries have the means to make a good return on such 
a large investment [the Olympic Games]." In the cross-section of countries, the random assignment 
assumption is thus indeed questionable since only countries which are sufficiently developed have the 
capacity of hosting the Games. We note, however, that all our regressions control for country fixed 
effects. Hence, whether countries are developed or not is captured by the country dummies. Indeed, 
when we estimate equation (1) using only OECD countries the results we obtain are very similar. Those 
results are reported in Table 3 of the Supplementary Online Appendix.  
 If the assignment of the Olympic Games is not random and depends on the economic growth 
performance of the bidding and hosting countries, then the ex-ante coefficients on GDP per capita 
growth should be different for the hosting and bidding countries. As we have already seen in Panel A of 
Table 4 this is not the case. Another way to check whether the assignment of the Olympic Games is 
endogenous to the economic conditions present in the hosting and bidding countries is to test whether 
bidding countries that during the sample period eventually hosted at least once the Games have a 
different anticipatory behavior relative to bidding countries that never hosted the Games. In this vein, 
we re-estimated equation (1), separating the bidding indicator, Bidct, into two indicators: one indicator, 
that is unity for those bidding countries that during the sample period eventually hosted at least once 
the Games; and another indicator that is unity for those bidding countries that despite bidding never 
hosted the Games. The results are presented in Panel B of Table 4. The main finding is that the data 
point to no significant difference between successful and unsuccessful bidders. Hence this robustness 
check fails to provide evidence that, conditional on country fixed effects, countries' economic growth 
performance determines the IOC's decision on which country will host the Olympic Games.  
                                                                                                                                                                       
variables significantly responded in advance before the hosting of the Expo and World Cup. However, in contrast to the 
Olympic Games, competition in the bidding phase for the Expo and World Cup is limited; hence, these events do not 
allow us to study anticipations effects and this is the reason why in the current paper those results are not reported.   
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We can also directly test the randomness of the assignment by examining whether within-
country variations in GDP per capita growth have a significant effect on the likelihood of bidding for 
the Olympic Games. To do so, we report in columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 estimates that regress an 
indicator variable equal to unity during the year when countries bid to host the Olympic Games on the 
GDP per capita growth of that particular year. We report estimates from a linear probability model in 
column (1). In column (2), we report estimates from a conditional logit fixed effects model. We note 
that while the conditional logit fixed effects model takes into account the binary nature of the 
dependent variable the estimates produced by this model are not marginal effects.5 The main finding in 
columns (1) and (2) is that both, the linear probability model and the conditional logit fixed effects 
model show that countries' GDP per capita growth has an insignificant effect on the likelihood of 
bidding for the Games. Also, it is noteworthy that in quantitative terms the estimates from the linear 
probability model imply that, at most, a one percentage point higher GDP per capita growth increases 
the likelihood of bidding for the Olympic Games by 0.007 percentage points. This is, indeed, a very 
small effect.  
In columns (3) and (4) of Table 7 we repeat the exercise for an indicator variable that is equal to 
unity during the year when a country was selected to host the Olympic Games. In line with our 
identifying assumption that conditional on fixed country characteristics the Olympic Games are 
randomly assigned, we find that economic growth has no significant effect on the likelihood of being 
selected to host the Games. This result holds for both the linear probability model and the conditional 
logit fixed effects model. And, it holds both for the contemporaneous effect (Panel A) as well as for 
possible lagged effects (Panel B). 
 
 
4.2 The Role of Country Characteristics 
In Section 3 we found that the announcement of the Olympic Games hosting country generates positive 
output, investment, private consumption, and government consumption spending responses. An 
interesting question that we can examine with our panel data is whether the marginal effect of hosting 
the Olympic Games varies across countries as a function of important features; such as government 
size, trade openness, political institutions, or geography. These variables have been found to be 
                                                 
5 In general, it is not possible to compute marginal effects from a conditional logit fixed effects model since that would 
require knowledge of the distribution of the fixed effects (see Wooldridge, 2002). 
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significant determinants of economic growth in the cross-section of countries. It could, therefore, be 
also of interest to examine whether these variables induce significant heterogeneity in the marginal 
effect that hosting the Olympic Games has on output growth across countries. 
 Table 8 presents the results from a specification where the marginal effect of the Olympic 
Games is allowed to vary across countries. With the exception of trade openness we find that the 
interaction estimates are statistically insignificant. Trade openness interacts negatively with the hosting 
of the Olympic Games. Hence, more open economies seem to gain less from the hosting of the Games. 
This finding is in line with the results in Rose and Spiegel (2011): it indicates that less open countries 
have more to gain from hosting the Games. However, there could be multiple reasons for this. One 
such possible reason that is provided in Rose and Spiegel, is that the Olympic Games lead to countries 
becoming more open to trade. However, another and equally plausible reason is that in more open 
economies leakages of demand effects are larger. In fact, it is well understood in macroeconomics that 
in open economies the size of local demand effects on output is typically smaller than in closed 
economies. 
 
4.3 Summer vs. Winter Games 
In the benchmark model we pool the summer and winter Olympic Games together. Since the winter 
games are a much smaller event constraining the coefficient estimates to be the same across those 
games might be misleading.6 For that reason we re-estimated equation (1) separating the Olympics into 
winter and summer games. The results are presented in Tables 9 and 10. The main finding is that the 
winter games have a smaller effect than the summer games. Nevertheless, the effects of the winter 
games are still significantly positive and anticipation is confirmed in both events. Rose and Spiegel 
(2011) find that the winter games alone have no statistically significant impact on international trade 
levels. Our findings imply that there is much more than openness to trade to gain by hosting the 
Olympics. 
 
 
                                                 
6 The fact that hosts for the winter games are not chosen at random because one needs a mountain with snow on it to 
qualify as a host (or even to be considered as a serious bidder) is not a problem in our panel fixed effects estimation. The 
reason is that during the time period we consider, these geographic characteristics of countries are time invariant 
variables and, therefore, are captured by the country fixed effects. 
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4.4 Further Robustness Checks 
Many economists have shown that stock price movements reflect the market’s expectation of future 
developments in the economy (see e.g. Fama (1990) and Schwert (1990)). Moreover, Beaudry and 
Portier (2006)  use those stock market series to extract news shocks from the data. Given the nature of 
our exercise and its conclusions it is only natural to ask whether the anticipatory effects for the 
organization of the Olympic Games are reflected in the movements of the stock market. Using the IFS 
data on stock price indices, we can examine whether the Olympic bid has significant anticipatory 
effects on the evolution of stock prices of the hosting and bidding countries. The results that we present 
in Appendix Table 4 confirm our findings. The anticipatory effects of the Olympics on stock prices are 
positive and significant eight years before the hosting of the Games for both successful and 
unsuccessful bidders. And these significant positive responses are of similar magnitude in the two 
groups of countries. 
In Rose and Spiegel (2011) the Olympics carry a signal of trade liberalization and increase the 
level of exports permanently. In Appendix Tables 5 to 8 we re-examine the effects that the Olympic 
Games have on exports and imports. Our main finding is that exports and imports significantly increase 
before the actual hosting of the Olympic Games. This is true for both the bidding and the hosting 
countries.  However, the cumulative effects of hosting and bidding for the Olympic Games on exports 
and imports are statistically insignificant. 
 Our baseline estimating equation included up to ten leads of the Olympic Games bidding and 
hosting indicator. The reason for this is that, during the 1950-2009 period, bidding for the Olympic 
Games occurred as far as ten years before the actual hosting of the Games. If our main argument of 
Olympic Games inducing significant anticipation effects is correct then, given the timing in the bidding 
for the Olympic Games, we should not observe any significant effects of the bidding and hosting 
indicator further ahead than 10 years before the actual hosting of the Olympic Games. To check this, 
we re-estimated equation (1) including up to 15 leads of the Olympic Games bidding and hosting 
indicator. The results from this estimation are presented in Appendix Table 9. The main finding is that 
the leads for years t+11 to t+15 are insignificant; both for the bidding and hosting indicator. Hence, this 
is reassuring evidence that, indeed, our estimation strategy correctly estimates the timing of the 
anticipatory effect of the Olympic Games. 
 As a further identification check we repeated the estimation of equation (1) splitting the 
Olympic Games bidding indicator into: (i) an indicator that is unity for bidding countries that are from 
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the same continent as the host of the previous Olympic Games; (ii) an indicator that is unity for bidding 
countries that are not from the same continent as the host of the previous Olympic Games. Appendix 
Table 10 shows that the effects in these two groups of bidding countries are of similar magnitude. In 
particular, in both groups there is evidence of a significant effect on output growth eight to ten years 
before the hosting of the Olympic Games. It is therefore not the case that significant anticipatory 
effects are absent in bidding countries which are from the same continent as the host of the previous 
Olympic Games. 
 Our panel estimates reflect an average effect that the Olympic Games had on output growth 
over the 1950-2009 period. To examine whether the effects of hosting the Olympics have changed 
during the most recent decades, we re-estimated equation (1) interacting the hosting indicator variable 
with a dummy for the post-1990 period. One reason for why the effects could be different for the post-
1990 period is the end of the Cold War which led to a significant change in international relations. 
Other reasons, that could possibly go in opposite directions, include the decline in transportation costs 
that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s and the increase in competition for hosting the Olympics Games 
(see Preuss (2004)). Appendix Table 11 shows that the effects of the Olympic Games on output growth 
are not significantly different for the post-1990 period. Hence, this suggests that the output effects of 
the Olympics Games are not systematically different for the most recent decades. 
 In the empirical analysis we have used aggregate data to evaluate the effects of the Olympics. 
Some of the countries in our sample are large and the organization of a mega-event in one region can 
have positive spillover effects to other regions in that country. Hence, our results reflect country-wide 
average effects. To examine also regional effects of hosting the Olympics we obtained data on total real 
gross per capita state product for the US from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.1 The USA has hosted 
five Olympic Games in our sample: the 1960 Winter Olympics in Squaw Valley, CA, the 1980 Winter 
Olympics in Lake Placid, NY, the 1984 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles, CA, the 1996 Summer 
Olympics, in Atlanta, GA, and the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, UT.  We repeated our 
analysis by substituting countries with US states. The results are reported in Appendix Table 12 of the 
online appendix. According to Panel A of Appendix Table 12, hosting the Olympic Games generates 
increases in GSP growth two years before the actual hosting of the event. GSP growth also increases 
significantly five years before the hosting of the Olympic Games in unsuccessful bidding countries, 
thus confirming the presence of anticipation effects (see Panel B). Appendix Table 13 also shows that 
the delayed effects of hosting the Olympics are considerable and last up to three years after the Games. 
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At the peak, US states that organized the Olympics saw their gross state product increase by more than 
three percentage points relative to states that did not undertake the organization of these events. Hence 
although some caution must be exercised because of the smaller sample, the findings of the baseline 
analysis are mostly confirmed by the regional data. 
 A remark regarding standard errors is worthwhile. In all our regressions we clustered standard 
errors at the country level. The purpose of clustering at the country level is that the computed standard 
errors are robust to arbitrary within-country serial correlation. To also ensure that our results are robust 
to arbitrary spatial correlation across countries within any given year (in addition to arbitrary within-
country serial correlation) we report in Appendix Table 14 results that cluster standard errors at the 
country and year level, using the Cameron et al. (2011) multi-cluster estimator. The main result is that 
using such a multi-cluster estimator produces standard errors that are very similar to those reported in 
our baseline regressions. 
Finally, we have also repeated our exercise using GDP per worker instead of GDP per capita. 
Results are very similar and are presented in Table 15 of the supplementary online appendix. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
Starting from Pigou (1926) and Keynes (1936) until the recent work of Beaudry and Portier (2004, 
2006, 2007), Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2012), economists have 
stressed the importance of expectations in determining the evolution of aggregate macroeconomic data. 
However, we are not aware of any empirical work that quantifies such effects directly in the data. In the 
sense that no study has shown so far how the uncertainty about news affects aggregate macroeconomic 
outcomes and the effects of its resolution. Most of the existing evidence for the presence of anticipation 
in macroeconomics is indirect. Anticipation effects present serious challenges to empirical research (see 
also the discussion in Blanchard et al., 2010). Recent studies on the identification of fiscal shocks have 
shown that anticipation effects might be crucial for determining the effects of such shocks in the 
macroecocomy (see e.g. Leeper et al. (2012), Mertens and Ravn (2010), or Ramey (2011)).  
 Beaudry and Portier (2006) estimate the macroeconomic effects of shocks in the stock price 
index and showed that such shocks cause a boom in the economy. Barsky and Sims (2012), using a 
different identification strategy contradict their results, raising a debate in the literature on the role of 
news shocks in aggregate fluctuations. We use the bidding for the Olympic Games as an alternative 
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way to identify  news shocks in the data and we confirm the results of Beaudry and Portier (2006). By 
taking advantage of the time structure in the bidding for and hosting of the Olympic Games we are able 
to quantify the effects of anticipatory behavior on macroeconomic aggregates. We find that such effects 
are economically important and statistically significant. News about Olympic Games makes output and 
investment surge already at the time of the bidding. In unsuccessful bidding countries the agents’ 
optimism turns out to be unjustified and, as a result, the economy returns to its original trend, while 
hosting economies enjoy quantitatively large and significant positive effects from hosting. The 
insignificant and quantitatively small cumulative effect for bidding countries that do not win the Games 
resembles the Pigou (1927) cycles analyzed in Beaudry and Portier (2004) -- an initial period of over-
optimism in response to submitting a potential winning bid is followed by a corresponding decrease in 
activity when the positive news does not materialize. 
 Many studies have claimed that hosting the Olympic Games has no measurable economic 
effects, but these studies concentrate on the delayed or contemporaneous effect. Our results indicate 
that the anticipatory and ex-ante effects of hosting the Olympic Games on economic growth are 
statistically significant and economically important. Hence, hosting of the Olympic Games involves 
more benefits than an “olive wreath”, according to Herodotus. 
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Table 1. The Contemporaneous and Ex-Ante Effects of Bidding for the Olympics
ΔLog(GDP) ΔLog
(Investment)
ΔLog(Private 
Consumption)
ΔLog(Government 
Expenditure)
ΔLog(Price 
Level)
ΔLog(Exchange 
Rate)
BiddingCountry 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.000 0.023 -0.034
(0.005) (0.016) (0.004) (0.008) (0.013) (0.026)
F.BiddingCountry -0.003 -0.077 -0.005 0.042 -0.042 0.049
(0.005) (0.043) (0.004) (0.036) (0.026) (0.041)
F2.BiddingCountry -0.005 -0.019 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.014
(0.007) (0.014) (0.004) (0.006) (0.017) (0.032)
F3.BiddingCountry 0.008 -0.032 0.001 0.037 -0.042 0.030
(0.005) (0.034) (0.005) (0.036) (0.032) (0.051)
F4.BiddingCountry 0.002 0.006 0.002 -0.000 -0.029 0.000
(0.003) (0.010) (0.004) (0.005) (0.024) (0.034)
F5.BiddingCountry -0.007 -0.013 -0.004 -0.009 0.009 -0.074
(0.004) (0.020) (0.004) (0.014) (0.013) (0.042)
F6.BiddingCountry 0.006 -0.001 0.005 0.005 0.021 -0.076
(0.006) (0.018) (0.005) (0.006) (0.015) (0.040)
F7.BiddingCountry 0.006 0.023** 0.011*** -0.005 0.014 -0.079
(0.004) (0.011) (0.004) (0.013) (0.009) (0.045)
F8.BiddingCountry 0.009*** 0.043*** 0.007** 0.002 0.020 -0.069
(0.003) (0.011) (0.004) (0.005) (0.013) (0.040)
F9.BiddingCountry 0.004 0.039*** 0.004 0.007 -0.000 -0.028
(0.004) (0.014) (0.004) (0.006) (0.010) (0.033)
F10.BiddingCountry -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.003 -0.018
(0.008) (0.028) (0.008) (0.007) (0.014) (0.029)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6062 6062 6062 6062 6062 6062
Number of Countries 188 188 188 188 188 188
Note: The method of estimation is least squares. Huber robust standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the country level. **Significantly 
different from zero at 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence. 
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Table 2. Anticipatory Effects of Bidding for the Olympics
ΔLog(GDP) ΔLog
(Investment)
ΔLog(Private 
Consumption)
ΔLog(Government 
Expenditure)
ΔLog(Price 
Level)
ΔLog(Exchange 
Rate)
All Bidding Countries
10 Years Before Hosting
-0.002
(0.005)
0.002
(0.019)
-0.002
(0.005)
-0.007
(0.005)
-0.002
(0.010)
-0.013
(0.023)
All Bidding Countries
9 Years Before Hosting
0.003
(0.004)
0.033***
(0.010)
0.003
(0.004)
0.007
(0.005)
-0.010
(0.007)
-0.012
(0.021)
All Bidding Countries
8 Years Before Hosting
0.006*
(0.003)
0.030**
(0.012)
0.008**
(0.004)
-0.002
(0.004)
0.013
(0.009)
-0.053*
(0.027)
All Bidding Countries
7 Years Before Hosting
0.002
(0.003)
-0.001
(0.010)
0.003
(0.004)
0.001
(0.004)
-0.001
(0.007)
-0.041
(0.028)
All Bidding Countries
6 Years Before Hosting
0.002
(0.004)
-0.001
(0.001)
0.002
(0.004)
-0.001
(0.005)
0.014
(0.012)
-0.054**
(0.026)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6062 6062 6062 6062 6062 6062
Number of Countries 188 188 188 188 188 188
Note: The method of estimation is least squares. Huber robust standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the country level. **Significantly 
different from zero at 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence. 
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Table 3. The Contemporaneous and Ex-Ante Effects of Hosting the Olympics
ΔLog(GDP) ΔLog
(Investment)
ΔLog(Private 
Consumption)
ΔLog(Government 
Expenditure)
ΔLog(Price 
Level)
ΔLog(Exchange 
Rate)
HostingCountry 0.009 0.021 0.010** 0.014 0.013 -0.058
(0.005) (0.013) (0.005) (0.009) (0.017) (0.048)
F.HostingCountry 0.008 -0.002 0.007* 0.012 -0.010 -0.033
(0.006) (0.019) (0.004) (0.010) (0.018) (0.051)
F2.HostingCountry 0.017** 0.025 0.016*** 0.018** -0.012 -0.038
(0.008) (0.017) (0.006) (0.009) (0.025) (0.061)
F3.HostingCountry 0.017*** 0.043*** 0.016*** 0.006 0.022 -0.095
(0.004) (0.013) (0.005) (0.010) (0.014) (0.053)
F4.HostingCountry 0.026*** 0.061*** 0.019*** 0.013*** 0.016 -0.082**
(0.006) (0.014) (0.007) (0.005) (0.010) (0.035)
F5.HostingCountry 0.015** 0.048** 0.012 0.001 0.036** -0.098**
(0.006) (0.019) (0.007) (0.014) (0.018) (0.040)
F6.HostingCountry 0.005 -0.006 0.001 0.005 0.032 -0.069**
(0.009) (0.030) (0.009) (0.009) (0.023) (0.035)
F7.HostingCountry -0.001 0.004 -0.003 0.004 0.018 -0.046*
(0.005) (0.014) (0.004) (0.006) (0.015) (0.027)
F8.HostingCountry -0.005 0.004 0.004 0.009 -0.013 -0.003
(0.010) (0.026) (0.007) (0.010) (0.012) (0.034)
F9.HostingCountry 0.002 0.011 0.006 0.005 -0.010 -0.007
(0.004) (0.015) (0.004) (0.008) (0.016) (0.021)
F10.HostingCountry 0.003 0.008 -0.002 0.002 -0.012 0.014
(0.008) (0.024) (0.005) (0.006) (0.016) (0.024)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6062 6062 6062 6062 6062 6062
Number of Countries 188 188 188 188 188 188
Note: The method of estimation is least squares. Huber robust standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the country level. **Significantly 
different from zero at 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence. 
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Table 4. Test of Difference: Bidding vs. Hosting Countries; Bidding Countries That Hosted at Least 
Once the Games vs. Bidding Countries that Never Hosted the Games
ΔLog(GDP)
Panel A: Hosting Countries vs. Bidding Countries Panel B: Bidding Countries That Hosted at Least Once the Games 
(HostingCountry_Host) vs. Bidding Countries that Never Hosted 
the Games (HostingCountry_NeverHost)
BiddingCountry- 
HostingCountry
0.45 HostingCountry_Host  - 
HostingCountry_NeverHost
0.60
F.BiddingCountry-
F.HostingCountry
0.15 F.HostingCountry_Host  - 
F.HostingCountry_NeverHost
0.71
F2.BiddingCountry-
F2.HostingCountry
0.07* F2.HostingCountry_Host  - 
F2.HostingCountry_NeverHost
0.41
F3.BiddingCountry-
F3.HostingCountry
0.05** F3.HostingCountry_Host  - 
F3.HostingCountry_NeverHost
0.28
F4.BiddingCountry-
F4.HostingCountry
0.00*** F4.HostingCountry_Host  - 
F4.HostingCountry_NeverHost
0.97
F5.BiddingCountry-
F5.HostingCountry
0.00*** F5.HostingCountry_Host  - 
F5.HostingCountry_NeverHost
0.99
F6.BiddingCountry-
F6.HostingCountry
0.97 F6.HostingCountry_Host  - 
F6.HostingCountry_NeverHost
0.61
F7.BiddingCountry-
F7.HostingCountry
0.27 F7.HostingCountry_Host  - 
F7.HostingCountry_NeverHost
0.54
F8.BiddingCountry-
F8.HostingCountry
0.21 F8.HostingCountry_Host  - 
F8.HostingCountry_NeverHost
0.13
F9.BiddingCountry-
F9.HostingCountry
0.70 F9.HostingCountry_Host  - 
F9.HostingCountry_NeverHost
0.63
F10.BiddingCountry-
F10.HostingCountry
0.70 F10.HostingCountry_Host  - 
F10.HostingCountry_NeverHost
0.11
Country Fixed Effects Yes Country Fixed Effects Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Year Fixed Effects Yes
Observations 6062 Observations 6062
Number of Countries 188 Number of Countries 188
Note: The method of estimation is least squares. The reported p-values on the test of zero difference are based on Huber robust standard errors clustered at 
the country level. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, **Significantly different from zero at 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent 
confidence. 
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Table 5. The Ex-Post Effects of Hosting the Olympics
ΔLog(GDP) ΔLog 
(Investment)
ΔLog(Private 
Consumption)
ΔLog(Government 
Expenditure)
ΔLog(Price 
Level)
ΔLog(Exchange 
Rate)
L.HostingCountry 0.000 -0.023 0.008 0.018 0.017 -0.063
(0.005) (0.018) (0.007) (0.011) (0.020) (0.034)
L2.HostingCountry -0.001 -0.032** 0.007 0.007 -0.019 -0.015
(0.007) (0.015) (0.006) (0.010) (0.013) (0.044)
L3.HostingCountry 0.010 0.005 0.005 0.015 0.001 -0.029
(0.006) (0.021) (0.006) (0.012) (0.016) (0.041)
L4.HostingCountry 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.006 -0.006 -0.025
(0.006) (0.014) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.036)
L5.HostingCountry 0.011** -0.005 0.008 0.005 -0.006 -0.030
(0.005) (0.018) (0.006) (0.009) (0.015) (0.049)
L6.HostingCountry 0.016*** 0.022 0.014** 0.004 0.000 -0.012
(0.006) (0.019) (0.006) (0.011) (0.014) (0.041)
L7.HostingCountry -0.006 -0.012 -0.006 -0.007 0.003 -0.020
(0.013) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.043)
L8.HostingCountry -0.013 -0.023 -0.005 -0.006 -0.018 0.128
(0.008) (0.021) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.114)
L9.HostingCountry -0.007 -0.008 -0.006 -0.004 -0.015 0.234
(0.006) (0.020) (0.007) (0.009) (0.021) (0.211)
L10.HostingCountry -0.010 -0.043 -0.008 -0.004 -0.033 0.018
(0.009) (0.029) (0.011) (0.007) (0.028) (0.035)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6062 6062 6062 6062 6062 6062
Number of Countries 188 188 188 188 188 188
Note: The method of estimation is least squares. Huber robust standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the country level. **Significantly 
different from zero at 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence. 
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Table 6. Cumulative Effects of Hosting and Bidding for the Olympics
ΔLog(GDP) ΔLog
(Investment)
ΔLog(Private 
Consumption)
ΔLog(Government 
Expenditure)
ΔLog(Price 
Level)
ΔLog(Exchange 
Rate)
Panel A: Hosting Country
Sum of coefficients: 
L10.HostingCountry to 
F.10HostingCountry
0.098*
(0.056)
0.101
(0.094)
0.105*
(0.606)
0.123
(0.099
0.006
(0.100)
-0.328
(0.670)
Panel B. Bidding Country
Sum of coefficients: 
L10.BiddingCountry to 
F.10BiddingCountry
-0.020
(0.032)
-0.005
(0.083)
-0.010
(0.031)
0.011
(0.031)
-0.052
(0.051)
-0.049
(0.445)
Panel C. Difference Between Hosting Country and Bidding Country
Difference Between Panel A
and Panel B
0.118**
(0.060)
0.105
(0.100)
0.115*
(0.065)
0.112
(0.085)
0.058
(0.107)
-0.280
(0.700)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6062 6062 6062 6062 6062 6062
Number of Countries 188 188 188 188 188 188
Note: The method of estimation is least squares. Huber robust standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the country level. *Significantly 
different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence. 
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Table 7. The Effects of GDP Growth on the Likelihood of Bidding for the Olympic Games and 
Winning the Bid for Hosting the Olympic Games
Pr(Bidding) Pr(Winning the Bid)
Panel A: Contemporaneous GDP Growth Only
LS Logit LS Logit
ΔLog(GDP) 0.007
(0.007)
3.127
(4.336)
0.002
(0.002)
5.002
(8.124)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6850 6850 7228 7228
Number of Countries 188 188 188 188
Panel B: GDP Growth Up to 5 Years Lagged
ΔLog(GDP) 0.001
(0.002)
5.926
(8.433)
0.005
(0.007)
5.248
(5.981)
L.ΔLog(GDP) -0.002
(0.004)
-7.648
(8.563)
-0.002
(0.010)
-7.304
(5.202)
L2.ΔLog(GDP) 0.000
(0.002)
1.078
(9.778)
-0.005
(0.008)
0.532
(5.398)
L3.ΔLog(GDP) 0.001
(0.003)
0.513
(8.806)
0.009
(0.007)
6.113
(5.754)
L4.ΔLog(GDP) -0.000
(0.002)
-4.792
(9.028)
0.012
(0.008)
7.627
(5.461)
L5.ΔLog(GDP) 0.005
(0.004)
12.947
(10.117)
-0.007
(0.007)
-5.803
(4.617)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6286 6286 5910 5910
Number of Countries 188 188 188 188
Note: The method of estimation is in columns (1) and (3) is least squares; columns (2) and (4) maximum likelihood. Reported coefficients in columns (2) 
and (4) are from a conditional logit fixed effects regression, and do not represent marginal effects. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is an 
indicator variable that is unity during the year when countries bid to host the Olympic Games. The dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is an 
indicator variable that is unity during the year when the country was selected to host the Olympic Games. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent 
confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence. 
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Table 8. The Role of Trade Openness and Other Country Characteristics
ΔLog(GDP)
Sum of coefficients: 
L10.HostingCountry to 
F.10Hosting Country
0.222***
[3.41]
0.117***
[1.99]
0.148***
[2.80]
0.121**
[2.23]
0.117**
[2.03]
Interaction with: Average 
(EXP+IMP)/GDP
-0.010**
[-2.61]
Interaction with: Average 
GOV/GDP
-0.009
[-0.34]
Interaction with: Average 
GDP Per Capita
-0.003
[-0.12]
Interaction with: Average 
Polity Score
-0.007
[0.31]
Interaction with: North 
America Indicator
0.105
[1.04]
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6062 6062 6062 6062 6062
Number of Countries 188 188 188 188 188
Note: The method of estimation is least squares. t-values [reported in square brackets] are based on Huber robust standard errors clustered at the country 
level. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence. 
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Table 9. The Contemporaneous and Ex-Ante Effects of Hosting and Bidding for the Winter Olympics 
Panel A: Hosting Country  ΔLog(GDP) Panel B:Bidding Country ΔLog(GDP)
 HostingCountry -0.012 BiddingCountry 0.001
(0.009) (0.008)
F.HostingCountry -0.009 F.BiddingCountry -0.001
(0.011) (0.006)
F2.HostingCountry -0.001 F2.BiddingCountry -0.017
(0.007) (0.012)
F3.HostingCountry 0.008 F3.BiddingCountry 0.001
(0.007) (0.005)
F4.HostingCountry 0.021** F4.BiddingCountry -0.002
(0.010) (0.005)
F5.HostingCountry 0.006 F5.BiddingCountry -0.008
(0.008) (0.005)
F6.HostingCountry -0.003 F6.BiddingCountry 0.011
(0.013) (0.008)
F7.HostingCountry -0.006 F7.BiddingCountry 0.001
(0.007) (0.004)
F8.HostingCountry -0.004 F8.BiddingCountry 0.008**
(0.010) (0.004)
F9.HostingCountry -0.001 F9.BiddingCountry 0.007
(0.006) (0.005)
F10.HostingCountry 0.002 F10.BiddingCountry -0.000
(0.008) (0.007)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Country Fixed Effects Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Year Fixed Effects Yes
Observations 6062 Observations 6062
Number of Countries 188 Number of Countries 188
Note: The method of estimation is least squares. Huber robust standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the country level. **Significantly 
different from zero at 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence. 
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Table 10. The Contemporaneous and Ex-Ante Effects of Hosting and Bidding for the Summer Olympics
Panel A: Hosting Country  ΔLog(GDP) Panel B:Bidding Country ΔLog(GDP)
 HostingCountry 0.028*** BiddingCountry 0.010
(0.007) (0.006)
F.HostingCountry 0.021** F.BiddingCountry 0.001
(0.010) (0.007)
F2.HostingCountry 0.034*** F2.BiddingCountry 0.005
(0.013) (0.005)
F3.HostingCountry 0.021*** F3.BiddingCountry 0.008
(0.007) (0.005)
F4.HostingCountry 0.020*** F4.BiddingCountry 0.003
(0.007) (0.005)
F5.HostingCountry 0.016 F5.BiddingCountry -0.004
(0.012) (0.006)
F6.HostingCountry 0.017 F6.BiddingCountry 0.003
(0.010) (0.007)
F7.HostingCountry -0.003 F7.BiddingCountry 0.011**
(0.006) (0.005)
F8.HostingCountry -0.019 F8.BiddingCountry 0.011**
(0.017) (0.005)
F9.HostingCountry 0.000 F9.BiddingCountry 0.001
(0.005) (0.007)
F10.HostingCountry -0.001 F10.BiddingCountry 0.001
(0.011) (0.012)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Country Fixed Effects Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Year Fixed Effects Yes
Observations 6062 Observations 6062
Number of Countries 188 Number of Countries 188
Note: The method of estimation is least squares. Huber robust standard errors (reported in parentheses) are clustered at the country level. **Significantly 
different from zero at 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence. 
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Data Appendix Table 1: List of Bidding and Hosting Countries
34
Bidding Countries Year Bidding Countries Year Hosting Countries Year
Argentina 1956 Malaysia 2008 Australia 1956
Argentina 1968 Mexico 1956 Australia 2000
Argentina 2004 Mexico 1960 Austria 1964
Australia 1992 Netherlands 1952 Austria 1976
Australia 1996 Netherlands 1992 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1984
Australia 2006 Norway 1968 Canada 1976
Austria 1960 Norway 1992 Canada 1988
Austria 1964 Poland 2006 China 2008
Belgium 1960 Russia 1976 Finland 1952
Belgium 1964 Slovak Republic 2006 France 1968
Bulgaria 1992 South Africa 2004 France 1992
Bulgaria 1994 Spain 1972 Germany 1972
Canada 1956 Spain 1998 Greece 2004
Canada 1964 Spain 2008 Italy 1956
Canada 1968 Sweden 1964 Italy 1960
Canada 1972 Sweden 1968 Italy 2006
Canada 1976 Sweden 1972 Japan 1964
Canada 1996 Sweden 1984 Japan 1972
Canada 2002 Sweden 1988 Japan 1998
Canada 2008 Sweden 1992 Korea, Republic of 1988
Cuba 2008 Sweden 1994 Mexico 1968
Egypt 2008 Sweden 1998 Norway 1952
Finland 1964 Sweden 2002 Norway 1994
Finland 1968 Sweden 2004 Russia 1980
Finland 1972 Switzerland 1960 Spain 1992
Finland 1976 Switzerland 1976 United States 1960
Finland 2006 Switzerland 2002 United States 1980
France 1968 Switzerland 2006 United States 1984
France 1992 Thailand 2008 United States 1996
France 2008 Turkey 2000 United States 2002
Germany 1960 Turkey 2008
Germany 1992 United Kingdom 1992
Germany 2000 United Kingdom 1996
Greece 1996 United Kingdom 2000
Hungary 1960 United States 1952
Italy 1952 United States 1956
Italy 1988 United States 1960
Italy 1992 United States 1964
Italy 1998 United States 1968
Italy 2004 United States 1972
Japan 1960 United States 1976
Japan 1968 United States 1980
Japan 1984 United States 1992
Japan 1988 United States 1994
Japan 2008 United States 1998
